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Articles
Constitutional Change and
International Government
by
CHANTAL THOMAS*
One year ago, thousands of activists converged on Seattle to
protest the biannual Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The riotous conditions in Seattle shattered the
conventional wisdom that only policy wonks are interested in trade
barriers.1 The protestors hailed from a broad spectrum of causes, and
the ruckus they created made headlines2 and preoccupied media spin
doctors.3
1 * Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks for many
helpful comments go to my Fordham colleagues Abner Greene, Jill Fisch, Martin
Flaherty, Terry Smith, Mark Patterson, Steve Thel and Ben Zipursky, as well as to
Dominique Carreau, Bill Davey, Katherine Franke, Rob Howse, David Kennedy, Joel
Paul, Paul Stephan, Daria Roithmayr, and Stephen Ross. Drafts of this paper were
presented at University of Illinois College of Law and the University of Michigan School
of Law workshops, and early versions of this paper were presented at the Fordham
University School of Law junior faculty workshop and a Harvard Law School Graduate
Program writers workshop. Thanks to all the participants in these workshops for their
helpful suggestions. Research for this paper was supported by generous grants from
Fordham University School of Law.
1. The Oxford Dictionary defines a "policy wonk" as a "person who takes an
excessive interest in minor details of political policy." THE CONCISE OXFORD
DICrIONARY (10th ed. 1999).
2. E.g., John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening- Seattle
Police Use Tear Gas; Mayor Declares a Curfew, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al; Helene
Cooper, Some Hazy, Some Erudite and All Angry-Diversity of WTO Protests Makes
Them Hard to Dismiss, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1999, at A2; Steven Greenhouse, A Carnival
of Derision to Greet the Princes of Global Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at A12.
3. E.g., Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 5, 1999); Take It Personally,
(CNN television broadcast, Dec. 2, 1999); The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Network
television broadcast, Dec. 1, 1999).
The WTO conference and the controversy surrounding it has
provoked a sudden, widespread realization that the legal rules that
affect our everyday lives-the food we eat, the clothes we wear, the
price of medicine,4 and the taxes we pay 5-now derive not only from
domestic but also from international sources. Quite simply, the rules
that affect how our economy operates and how it should be regulated
have changed to include a considerable body of international law. In
this Article, I argue that the change is so deep that it is constitutional.
By "constitutional," I mean a fundamental change in the
structure of American government. Conventional constitutional
theory divides such change into that resulting from changes in
constitutional interpretation, and that resulting from amendments
obtained through the procedures in Article Five of the Constitution.
Some theorists, however, such as Bruce Ackerman have articulated
"unconventional" theories of constitutional change.6  Under
Ackerman's theory, basic constitutional changes can occur outside the
Article Five procedure, through a process of informal popular
deliberation. Ackerman identifies such changes as "constitutional
moments" -moments when cataclysmic social ferment requires
fundamental "transformation" in governmental structure. 7
According to Ackerman, the Great Depression prompted the
most important "constitutional moment" of the twentieth century.
The challenge posed by the Great Depression to federal
governmental structure was met through the establishment of a wide
array of federal administrative agencies. The rise of administrative
government occurred without amending the text of the Constitution.
In every other way, however, it marked a structural change of
constitutional proportions that paralleled the post-Civil War
4. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
5. Joseph Kahn, U.S. Loses Dispute on Export Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at
Al ("The United States has suffered its largest defeat ever in a trade battle, losing a
dispute with Europe about tax policies in a ruling that deals a blow to trans-Atlantic
relations and could force American companies to pay billions of dollars more in taxes each
year.").
6. The term "unconventional" is used in BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 22-23 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] The
term is a double entendre in that, in addition to the meaning of "unusual," it also makes
reference to the fact that the Article Five procedure typically involves formal meetings of
lawmakers, or conventions.
7. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2298 (1999).
The founding of the federal Constitution and the adoption of the Civil War Amendments
to the Constitution were the first such moments. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS.
supra note 6, at 9.
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Reconstruction. 8 Ackerman argues that this change should be
recognized as an "unconventional" constitutional amendment9 that
emerged through a period in which lawmakers solicited and won the
endorsement of "an extraordinary number of their fellow citizens,"
after sustained and widespread popular deliberation, for an initiative
that would transform the structure of government.10
Ackerman's theory usefully highlights how social transformation
can effect fundamental change both in governmental structure and in
the legal doctrine that legitimates it. Economic globalization
represents a profound social change, and, as such, has required a
fundamental alteration of governmental structure-the incorporation
into the national government of substantial regulation from
international organizations whose mandate is to liberalize economic
flow across borders.
The alteration can be instructively compared with the alterations
arising from the New Deal era and the establishment of
administrative law as a significant force in federal government. This
Article argues that the rise of international economic organizations
has yielded a source of regulation so significant that it is a
fundamental alteration of the constitution of federal government.
The rise of this "international" branch transforms the structure of
federal government, much as the rise of administrative government
did in the early twentieth century.'2 The WTO, with 140 member
governments, is the largest example of this "international branch" of
federal government.13 The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), though currently only with three members-Canada,
Mexico, and the United States-is also impressive in its regulatory
scope, affecting not only trade but also investment and even the
8. Reconstruction resulted in a dramatic expansion of federal control over state
governments through the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
federal Constitution. Ackerman argues that, here again, the leaders of reform used
"unconventional" methods to achieve it-in this case, an unconventional interpretation of
the Constitution's formal amendment process. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra
note 6, at 22-23; see also id at 375 ("The only real parallel for [the New Deal's] root-and-
branch repudiation is Reconstruction.").
9. Id at 383-420.
10. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6, 266-94 (1991)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS].
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.
13. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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movement of persons.14 Other such organizations hover on the
horizon: the United States government hopes to participate in the
establishment of a hemisphere-wide trade organization through a
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas in 2005; and talks to expand
NAFTA have also been waiting in the wings. 15
Like domestic administrative government, international
government is a solution to a dilemma arising from a deeply
challenging economic phenomenon: in this case, it is the
phenomenon of economic globalization. While the Great Depression
produced unprecedented economic contraction, the phenomenon of
globalization has produced unprecedented economic expansion.16 By
the late 1980s, it was clear that the power of the global market was
straining against a host of trade and investment barriers imposed by
national governments. International economic organizations such as
the WTO and NAFTA have sought to facilitate international trade by
removing or streamlining these barriers. 17
At the moment, no clear constitutional position has been
articulated on the status of the legal arrangements that have managed
this transformation. This lack of clarity reflects an underlying
indeterminacy of the constitutional text, particularly with regard to
international trade agreements. This Article argues that the lack of
clarity in the constitutional text reflects an ambiguity in the political
theory fueling prevailing conceptions of democracy. One important
aspect of this ambiguity features competing conceptions of democracy
that privilege efficiency, on the one hand, and transparency, on the
other. Despite the ambiguity, the current mechanism for entering
into international trade agreements privileges the conception of
democracy, and the interpretation of the Constitution, that favors
efficiency. The mechanism should be altered to incorporate more
fully the other side of American political and constitutional discourse.
The Article also argues that the process of de facto constitutional
amendment caused by the "internationalization" of government has
only begun. Ackerman states that, for unconventional structural
14. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3473 (2000). The statute implements the North American Free Trade Agreement,
Dec. 8, 1992, 32 J.L.M. 289 (1993).
15. Helene Cooper & Jose de Cordoba, Chile Is Invited to Join NAFTA as U.S.
Pledges Free-Trade Zone for Americas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,1994, at A3.
16. See infra text accompanying note 30 for a further discussion of globalization. See
also Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2000).
17. See infra Part L.A for a further discussion of the function of these organizations.
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change to legitimately occur, it must be accompanied by a period of
widespread popular dialogue, debate and, ultimately, ratification.
18
Yet the construction of the international branch of government has,
over the last quarter-century until very recently, lacked such
coalescent popular discussion. Indeed, the protests in Seattle indicate
that such widespread awareness and discussion of international
government is only now emerging. Consequently, the international
branch is defective in some important ways. Substantively, and at
least in part as a result of its procedural opacity, it has failed to take
into account widespread concern for the preservation of social goals
that lie alongside and sometimes compete with free trade, such as
environmental protection, employment security, and consumer safety.
This Article challenges the notion that the immediate postwar
support for United States participation in such organizations as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides the legitimacy for
organizations such as the NAFTA and the WTO. 9 In 1995,
Ackerman and David Golove argued that contemporary international
economic organizations such as NAFTA and the WTO benefit from a
"constitutional consensus" that emerged after World War II. Such a
consensus, they argued, endorses structural innovations in federal
government that allowed participation in the IMF and its
contemporaries, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
the World Bank.20 The economic commitments required by those
early organizations, however, were substantially fewer than those now
required by NAFTA and the WTO, and so were much less important
than their modern-day counterparts in shaping domestic economic
regulation. Consequently, popular approval of American
participation in those earlier organizations should not be taken to
signify popular approval of NAFTA and the WTO, whose rules are
much broader in scope and whose enforcement powers are much
greater.
If the post-World War II constitutional consensus does not grant
legitimacy to these latter-day international economic organizations,
then how does the Constitution apply to them? This Article reflects
that the constitutional text is indeterminate on the question of how
the United States government should relate to the rest of the world-
18. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 266-94.
19. See infra Part I.
20. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
799, 907-25 (1995).
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that is, on the question of "foreign affairs" in United States
government.21 This indeterminacy results from textual susceptibility
to conflicting majoritarian and countermajoritarian impulses in
American political culture: the desire to uphold public preferences
on the one hand, and the fear, on the other hand, that public
preferences will undermine the public interest.22 In the area of
foreign affairs, the countermajoritarian impulse has typically
informed both the regulatory structure that has evolved, and the ways
in which courts have examined-or declined to examine-that
structure.
Because the Constitution is indeterminate, the solution to the
dilemma of governance posed by globalization is a political one. A
balance must be struck between various concerns in devising the new
structure. The way forward to reaching that balance promises to be
difficult. Widespread mistrust of globalization makes the
international branch controversial in a way that the "fourth"
administrative branch never was.23  The structural change is
additionally challenging because it does not just rearrange the
national distribution of power, but redistributes power to the
international order. The path must not be hewn around this dilemma,
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra p. 8 for a discussion of the use of the term "fourth branch" to describe
administrative agencies. I have adopted the term "international branch" to describe
contemporary international organizations, rather than the term "fifth branch." The term
"fifth branch" has been used through the years to describe various phenomena, all of
which are seen as dramatically altering the structure of federal government. See, e.g.,
SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 61-76
(1990); Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and
Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1989); William P. Fuller,
Congressional Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Much Needed Reforms on the Horizon, 17
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 419 (1993) (using the term to describe lobbying interests); Allan J.
Stein, FOIA and FACA: Freedom of Information in the "Fifth Branch"?, 27 ADMIN. L.
REV. 31, 64 (1975) (using the term to describe federal advisory committees). The term
was also used by John Rawls to describe the part of his ideal government in which public
goods are distributed according to the unanimous decision of all who contribute (Rawl's
fifth branch of government, the "exchange branch"). See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 282 (1971). With the exception of Rawls, all the cited authors argue that a recent
development in federal government fundamentally transforms it. The correctness of their
claims is beyond the scope of this Article; it is important to note, however, that it is
possible for any of these claims and my own included to be simultaneously correct. What
is important is not, therefore, the numerical identity of this new aspect of federal
government, but rather its emergence. The emergence of other de facto branches of
government may well underscore the dynamic that has led to the rise of international
government.
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however, but through it.24 The current international regulatory
structure, which comparatively evades public input, should be
replaced with genuine efforts to generate and sustain broad dialogue
as to how the international branch should look.
Part One of this Article compares the international branch of
government to the "fourth," administrative branch. Part Two
observes that constitutional interpretation has varied on the
appropriate structure of the international branch. Part Three assesses
underlying constitutional and democratic principles that inform this
indeterminacy. Finally, Part Four offers some suggestions for how to
move forward towards a fuller reflection of this range of values in the
international branch.
I. Comparing the International Branch of Federal
Government to the Administrative Branch
We are entering upon the creation of a body of administrative law
quite different in its machinery, its remedies, and its necessary
safeguards from the old methods of regulation .... There will be no
withdrawal from these experiments. We shall go on; we shall
expand them, whether we approve theoretically or not, because...
our new social and industrial conditions cannot be practically
accomplished by the old and simple procedure of legislatures and
courts as in the last generation.
Elihu Root, President, American Bar Association, (1916).25
When Elihu Root gave this address to his peers at the beginning
of the twentieth century, he was speaking of the expansion of
administrative law that loomed on the century's horizon. Root could
well have been speaking at the end of the twentieth century-but he
would not have been speaking about domestic administrative law,
whose contours had been refined over the intervening decades.
Rather, he would have been describing international administrative
law-in particular, the international economic law deriving from such
sources as the WTO and NAFTA.2 6
24. See infra Part IV.
25. Elihu Root, Address to the American Bar Association, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1916, at 749-
50.
26. This Article focuses on such international economic law and leaves open the
question of the regulatory function or status of "non-economic" international law, such as
civil and political human rights. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT
339 (1996).
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The international organizations that reside at the center of the
new branch of government accomplish, on a global scale, many,
though not all, of the same purposes as do domestic administrative
agencies on a national scale. There are historical and functional
similarities between the "fourth branch" -domestic administrative
agencies-and international economic organizations. There are also,
however, significant differences, some of which augur even greater
transformation of United States government than occurred during the
New Deal.
A. Parallels Between the "Administrative" and the "International"
Branch of United States Government
(1) Response to an Unanticipated Need for Economic Regulation
Both the domestic administrative branch and the international
branch set rules intended to manage economic phenomena
unanticipated at the founding of the United States Constitution. The
swift expansion of administrative agencies under the New Deal was
designed to redress the massive contraction of a newly industrialized
and increasingly interstate economy. Agencies such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and the National Labor Relations Board addressed perceived market
failures of excessive and disorderly competition.
Administrative agencies quickly became so important that, in
1935, Supreme Court Justice Jackson declared that they had "become
a veritable fourth branch of the Government. ' 27 This description was
adopted in 1937 by the President's Committee on Administrative
Management, 28  and, today, it is commonplace to refer to
administrative agencies as a de facto federal branch sitting alongside
the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches established by the
Constitution.29 There was no formal constitutional amendment
27. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
28. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT 39 (1937) (describing
administrative agencies as a "'fourth branch' of the Government").
29. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 passim (1984); see also Frank B.
Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243
(1999) (observing that administrative agencies are "often called an unaccountable fourth
branch of government"); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998) (discussing
"constitutionalism after the New Deal and its familiar revisions of the founding frame-
especially the creation of a 'fourth branch' of government").
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creating this "fourth branch"; yet the rise of administrative
government is recognized to have been a change of constitutional
importance.
The recent economic environment has radically differed,
however, from its early-century counterpart. The perception has not
been that an excessively competitive market needs to be reined in,
but rather that a reined-in market needs to be set free. By the 1980s,
when negotiations to establish the World Trade Organization and
NAFTA began, the boundaries that governments had imposed
around their national economies were out of keeping with the
concept of a globalized economy. This new era of economic
globalization meant that economic activity across borders was greater
in scale and different in kind (including not just goods but also
services and intellectual property) than it had ever been before.30 In
addition to dramatic increases in traditional trade in goods, other
areas of international economic activity were newly important.
International capital markets now dwarfed the international market
for goods. Banks, law firms, and other service-providers sought to
market their services internationally; yet they came up against
barriers to foreign service providers. Telecommunications providers
also wanted to go global. Intellectual property has also generated
extraordinary economic activity in the emerging information age. Yet
no organization or set of rules existed to govern these aspects of
international economic activity needs on a comprehensive scale. The
possibilities for economic growth seemed limitless-but the
regulations of national governments were holding the global market
back.
Established in 1995, the World Trade Organization addressed
these issues in a broadly multilateral format. All WTO members
adhere to a common core of rules on international intellectual
property protection. The WTO also provides a mechanism whereby
governments can commit to reductions in barriers to foreign services
and foreign investment. Finally, the WTO provides a relatively
30. In the past few decades, United States trade volume has multiplied nearly twenty-
fold. In 1970, the combined value of exports and imports was less than 15% of total gross
national product; by 1997 that figure had more than doubled. Cross-border capital
transactions have also increased exponentially in the past few decades. Worldwide foreign
direct investment in the late 1990s achieved "seven times the level in real terms in the
1970s." Worldwide short-term capital flows have tripled since the 1980s, now reaching
over $2 trillion annually. Thomas, supra note 16. For extensive data, and the orthodox
view, on globalization, see generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: GLOBALIZATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (1997).
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strong process for monitoring and enforcing these rules. The Trade
Policy Review Body conducts regular review of WTO members' trade
policy, and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) provides a speedy
system for addressing claims that a member is violating the WTO.
The DSB enforces decisions by requesting the offending government
to either cease the violating practice or provide compensation to the
complaining party, or by authorizing the complaining party to
retaliate against the offending government. Thus the WTO dispute
settlement resolution system is among the strongest multilateral
systems ever devised, likely surpassed only by those of the European
Union.
Alongside the WTO, the North American Free Trade
Agreement accomplishes similar goals, but on a regional rather than a
global scale. The three members of NAFTA go even further in the
way of reducing barriers and harmonizing regulations amongst
themselves, addressing not just trade and investment but also the
movement of persons across borders.
In the cases of both the administrative and the international
branches, there were early, limited precursors of the regulatory
innovations to come. In the case of domestic administrative law.
agencies had existed since the very beginning of the Republic. 31 For
example, an agency created "pursuant to a statute of September 29,
1789, provid[ed] for military pensions for 'invalids who were wounded
and disabled during the late war.' '32 With the New Deal, however,
"[n]ew agencies flew thick and fast. '33 Moreover, by contrast to the
narrow mandate of the early agencies, those created in the 1930s-the
National Labor Relations Board, the Securities Exchange
Commission, and others- "seemingly regulated all economic life." 34
Similarly, the first international economic organizations,
established after World War II, predated the emergence of the
international "branch" by several decades: the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank came into force in 1945, and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was established in 1948. 35
31. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 6 (3d ed. 1972).
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id.
35. The agreements creating the IMF and the World Bank were ratified by Congress
in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-286kk (1945). The GATT itself
was never formally ratified, but the results of subsequent trade negotiations occurring
under the auspices of the GATT were. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995).
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The international economic organizations created in the 1990s
exercise authority over a much wider regulatory range than their
earlier counterparts, however, and are much more authoritative.
(2) Delegation by Congress of Lawmaking Authority to Specialized
Regulatory Bodies
The establishment of both the domestic administrative and the
international branches has occurred largely as a result of
congressional delegation. In the first half of the twentieth century,
Congress enacted dozens of statutes either establishing
"independent" agencies, or delegating power to the President to
establish "executive" agencies, to regulate various aspects of
interstate commerce. The Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act
of 1934 delegated to the Securities and Exchange Commission the
power to control the sale of investment securities; the
Communications Act of 1934 delegated to the Federal
Communications Commission the power to regulate media
broadcasting; and so forth.
In the second half of the twentieth century, Congress has
delegated regulatory authority to international economic
organizations. Although Congress retains formal powers of
ratification, its substantive input is so limited that the action here
might be functionally conceptualized as a "double delegation. '36
First, Congress delegates economic regulatory authority to the
President to enable him to negotiate international agreements that
will affect domestic economic regulation. By entering into such
international agreements on behalf of the United States, the
President delegates that regulatory authority to the international
processes established by the agreement.
(3) Judicial Deference to Legislative Delegation
The delegation of regulatory authority to a specialized body has
been criticized as unconstitutional in the case of both the
administrative and international branches. Despite this, the courts
have generally stayed out of the delegation fray. In the case of the
domestic administrative branch, after a brief period of initial
resistance,37 courts generally withdrew themselves from the question
36. See infra pp. 26-27.
37. E.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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of delegation, intervening to strike a delegation down only when the
congressional delegation did not follow the formal requirements of
Article 1,38 or when the statute interfered with the powers of
appointment allocated to the executive branch by Article 11.39 For the
international branch, the courts never even underwent an initial
period of trepidation. Even in the height of the "nondelegation" era,
the same Supreme Court that struck down congressional delegation
of domestic regulatory power upheld congressional delegation of
international regulatory power.40
B. Differences Between the Administrative Branch and the International
Branch of United States Government
(1) Heightened Judicial Deference
Generally, the courts have come to look at the question of
legislative delegation as requiring a solution primarily between the
two political branches, with intervention by the courts justified only in
very rare circumstances. Courts have been even more reluctant,
however, to assess foreign affairs lawmaking.41  Joel Paul has
described the jurisprudence justifying such deference as a "discourse
of executive expediency." 42 This judicial deference has permitted the
extraordinary postwar accumulation by the executive branch of
lawmaking power in foreign affairs.43
(2) Decreased Accountability
Although neither the administrative branch nor the international
branch is directly accountable to the electorate, the international
branch is an order of magnitude less accountable than domestic
agencies. International agencies are the product of multilateral
agreement. As a consequence, the United States has only partial
38. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
39. E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
40. E.g., J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
41. See generally Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (1990).
42. Joel Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 772 (1998) ("The discourse of executive expediency
transformed presidential powers relative to Congress. Less visibly, the discourse changed
the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches. The expediency
principle justified an extraordinary degree of deference to the executive.").
43. Id.
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influence (although arguably more influence than any other member)
over the nature of the agency, the personnel that run it, and the rules
it administers.
(3) Political Undercurrents
In addition, the legitimacy of the international branch in the
public mind is far less assured than that of the domestic
administrative legal system, and the reasons for this are deeper and
more intractable than simply its relative novelty. Although New Deal
administrative law transferred accountability away from elected
officials, it did so with overwhelming public approval. While the New
Deal was overseen by experts and professionals, its populist objective
was to restrain market activity and increase economic security for a
majority of citizens. The mechanism was countermajoritarian, but the
product directly addressed majority concerns. There is no such
compensating dynamic in the countermajoritarian construction of the
international branch. Both the procedure used to construct the
international branch and the substantive policies that it pursues are
countermajoritarian. The WTO and NAFTA exist to liberalize rather
than constrain markets-a goal that, even if in the long-term interests
of an economy, causes short-term dislocations and is therefore viewed
with suspicion by a large portion of the public.44
44. Opinion polls consistently reflect widespread misgivings about trade liberalization
among the general public, even during these recent times of economic prosperity. See,
e.g., Helene Cooper, Shift into Reverse: Ban on Mexican Trucks in U.S. Interior Shows
Rise of Protectionism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at Al (citing recent Wall Street
Journal/NBC News poll which found that 62% of the respondents thought trade
agreements "endanger jobs"); Paul Magnuson et al., The Global Economy: Now for the
Slow Track, BUS. WK., Nov. 24, 1997, at 36 (discussing attempts by the White House and
other advocates of fast track to address "growing public fears that free trade leads
inevitably to economic and social disruption"); Louis Harris & Associates, Business Week
Survey, Sept. 3-7, 1997 (finding that 56% of those surveyed believed that "expanded trade
leads to a decrease in the number of U.S. jobs"); see also Helene Cooper, Experts' View of
Nafta's Economic Impact: It's a Wash, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1997, at A20 ("recent U.S.
polls show a majority believe trade agreements like Nafta destroy jobs at home"); Greg
Hitt, To California Vintners, Promised a Rose Garden, Fast-Track Bill Is Wreathed in
Grapes of Wrath, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1997, at A24 (citing recent Wall Street Journal/NBC
News poll which found that only "23% of those surveyed said Nafta has had a positive
impact on the nation's economy"); Gerald F. Seib, So Are We All Free Traders? Wel; Not
Quite, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1997, at A24 (citing recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News
poll which found that "by a 43% to 28% margin, Americans tend to think Nafta has had a
negative impact on America"); Yankelovich Partners Survey for CNN-Time, April 1997,
(51% opposing, 33% favoring, 16% unsure about GATT).
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And here lies the crux of the dilemma for foreign affairs law. On
the one hand, popular mistrust of economic liberalization is precisely
what justifies the use of a countermajoritarian procedure to achieve it,
since this mistrust is assumed to be misguided.45 On the other hand,
the use of countermajoritarian procedures to obtain unpopular policy
objectives undermines the long-term viability of such policies because
they are more likely to be viewed as lacking political legitimacy.46
Until now, the architects of the international branch have erred
on the side of excluding public participation from international
lawmaking in order to ensure that such lawmaking will actually reach
fruition.47  The vastly increased scope of current international
economic law, however, now renders this approach inappropriate.
The increased scope of international administrative law increases its
impact on everyday lives. As public awareness has increased, concern
has increased. This new era of both increased scope and increased
public awareness of the international branch demands revisiting and
revamping the procedures that have been used to construct it.
(4) Attenuated Regulatory Function
While many aspects of the international branch render a portrait
of a structural change even more dramatic than that effected by the
rise of domestic administrative government, there are differences that
arguably soften the impact of the international branch. One can
distinguish the function of an international economic organization
like the World Trade Organization from a domestic administrative
agency in at least two ways. First, the WTO does not have direct
powers of sanction; rather, it enforces decisions by requesting that
errant members reconcile their practices with WTO rules or by
authorizing retaliation against the errant state by other members.
45. To wit, the following recollection of free trade economist Jagdish N. Bhagwati:
"Paul Samuelson, my old teacher at MIT and the celebrated Nobel laureate in Economics,
recalls being asked... which proposition in economics is both true and counterintuitive.
He scratched his head for a while and then came up with the law of comparative
advantage." Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 219, 219 (1993).
46. Prepared Testimony of John J. Sweeney, President, American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations: Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2000) (statement of John J. Sweeney during
hearing on the "Outcome of the WTO Ministerial in Seattle" on Feb. 8, 2000) ("If we do
not do better in the future-if the global system continues to generate growing inequality,
environmental destruction and a race to the bottom for working people- then I can assure
you, it will generate broad opposition that will make Seattle look tame.").
47. See infra Part II for a description of the current process.
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Second, new WTO rules are set only through negotiation and
ratification by its members.
While these differences are important, it is still appropriate to
conceive of the function of an organization like the World Trade
Organization as regulatory. As to the first point, although the WTO
does not have direct powers of enforcement, it does exercise both
formal authority and practical authority. The WTO exercises formal
authority because its decisions are binding upon its members under
international law. It exercises practical authority because its
procedures for compliance have been followed. States have altered
their practices in conformity with WTO requests, and, where they
have not, other member states have duly followed the WTO's
procedures for sanction. As to the second point, while the WTO does
not set new rules, its dispute settlement body does enjoy considerable
authority in its power to interpret rules, even where there are critical
and very wide differences of opinion between members as to the
meaning of those rules.
The conventional understanding of these organizations, of
course, is precisely that they do not enjoy regulatory authority and
that, as such, concern along these lines is only an unfortunate
misunderstanding. Although the WTO and NAFTA are not identical
to domestic administrative agencies in their regulatory function, it
seems important to recognize the regulatory authority they do have.
Such recognition is important both to be able to appreciate how
contemporary international relations differ from preceding eras, and
to be able to appreciate-and respond to-the heart of the concern of
opponents to this new regulatory form.
H. The International Branch is Incomplete
They are pouring into Seattle this weekend in vans and on buses, by
air and on foot-the college students and the church groups, the
environmental campaigners, the Teamsters .... All of them say
they are outraged at the growing power of a group few even heard
about five years ago, the World Trade Organization.48
Substantively, public complaints about international economic
organization address outcomes of economic liberalization that are
perceived as undesirable. Many activists and commentators have
decried the pressure that the WTO exerts on member governments,
48. David E. Sanger, Meet Your Government, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,1999, § 4 at 1.
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as well as on companies engaged in trade, to relax what might broadly
be deemed the "social safety net." This safety net includes a web of
regulations to ensure such public goods as clean air, wildlife
conservation and food safety, as well as privately arranged workplace
conditions such as a certain level of employment security. According
to this view, the WTO unravels the social safety net both through its
rules, and through the "race to the bottom" fueled by the increased
trade and competition it creates. For example, WTO rulings have
invalidated United States clean air49 and wildlife conservation
50
regulations. In addition, the WTO has encouraged "harmonization"
of consumer safety regulations which have resulted in a relaxation of
United States standards.51 Finally, labor leaders have repeatedly
evoked concerns about the impact of WTO-related trade
liberalization on domestic employment security.52
These multiple substantive concerns take on particular
trenchancy, however, because of a deeper, shared procedural
objection: that the WTO operates without popular consent. The
Sierra Club, a prominent environmental organization, demonstrates
this connection in a pamphlet that summarizes a host of substantive
concerns including those listed above, but that is entitled No
Globalization Without Representation.53
And yet the WTO did not simply impose itself, unbidden, on the
American electorate. Its relationship to, and authority over, United
States government was ratified by both the President and Congress.
Why, then, are popular objections to the WTO mounting? One
answer is that the procedural mechanism used by the United States
for the WTO was devised for an international environment in which
international organizations exercised significantly less regulatory
power than they do today.
49. WTO Report of the Panel, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (29 January 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) (complaints by
Venezuela (WT/DS2) and Brazil (WT/DS4) in 1995).
50. WTO Report of the Panel, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (15 May 1998), 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) (complaint by
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (WTIDS58) in 1998).
51. Richard A. Merrill, Address at the Sixth Annual Health Law Symposium (March
13, 1998).
52. Sweeney Calls for WTO Reforms; Democrats Address UAW Conference, BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10, 2000.
53. SIERRA CLUB, NO GLOBALIZATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION, available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/summit/facthe.asp (Dec. 9, 1999).
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The foundation for United States submission to international
economic law is the "congressional-executive agreement." Under this
form, an international agreement is ratified by a simple majority of
both houses of Congress. The "congressional-executive agreement"
form is not explicitly condoned by the federal Constitution. Indeed,
the only sort of international agreement the Constitution explicitly
contemplates is the "treaty," defined by it as an agreement that the
President negotiates with the advice and two-thirds consent of the
Senate 4 The congressional-executive agreement was developed in
the wake of World War II, however, and was used to ease the process
of United States commitment to international economic
organizations. A simple majority was much easier to obtain than
supermajoritarian Senate approval, and general political viability of
the agreements was enhanced if the House of Representatives was
able to sign off on them. Accordingly, in the wake of World War II,
the congressional-executive agreement enabled the United States to
join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and to
further its commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.55
The congressional-executive agreement form allowed the United
States to ratify the building blocks of the postwar international
economic order. At the same time, the economic commitments these
agreements required did not dramatically affect everyday life in the
United States. The U.S. had already bilaterally lowered tariff barriers
with its major trading partners before World War II, making the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade a far less significant change
to U.S. trade policy than it would otherwise have been.56 Moreover,
the economic commitments that were required were supported by a
general political consensus that the United States should be a leader
in rebuilding world order after the war.57
Thus, in this early period, political support for and interest in
American internationalism was higher, and the economic
commitments such internationalism required were lower. Even
during the prosperity of the 1960s, however, popular support for
American internationalism began to wane, and congressional
trepidation about commitments made by the President in
54. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
55. See supra note 35.
56. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 470.
57. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 20, at 804.
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international trade negotiations increased, conflicting with
presidential ambitions to expand American internationalism. 58
By the early 1970s, popular support for American
internationalism had turned into popular suspicion of it. Politically,
the Vietnam War had cast a pall over the United States as a world
leader, and the Watergate scandal had sparked deep mistrust in the
federal executive branch. Economically, "stagflation"-a crippling
combination of rising prices and economic contraction-undermined
U.S. economic confidence. Moreover, many attributed the country's
economic difficulties to its openness to foreign trade.59 By 1973,
American internationalism was in crisis. This crisis manifested in
increasing popular pressure on Congress to take a more active role in
the congressional-executive agreement form by second-guessing and
altering commitments made by the President in international trade
negotiations. 60
The federal response to this crisis was the Trade Act of 1974 (the
"Trade Act"), and the strategy behind it is especially striking when
viewed through the Ackermanian lens that accords so much weight to
popular support for significant change in governmental structure.
Where lawmakers had engaged and enlisted the public in supporting
internationalism after World War II, they now sought to further
internationalism by shielding it from the public eye. The Trade Act
established the "fast track" mechanism to expedite and streamline
congressional consideration of trade agreements submitted by the
President by placing two important constraints on Congress. First,
the Trade Act shortened the time frame available to Congress to
review and debate an agreement; and second, it prohibited Congress
from amending the agreement, instead allowing Congress only to vote
it "up or down. '61
58. Consequently, Congress refused to condone two trade agreements negotiated by
President Kennedy, on the grounds that these agreements involved non-tariff
commitments. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 313.
59. See DR. RAvI BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE: A PLAN FOR AMERICA'S
ECONOMIC REVIVAL 128-29 (1993).
60. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 32 (1990).
61. With this modification, a congressional-executive agreement proceeds through the
following steps. Congress enacts a statute delegating to the President the authority to
negotiate and enter into an international trade agreement. The President does so, and
then presents Congress with the agreement, along with a "statement of administrative
action" indicating what actions are required to implement obligations imposed by the
agreement. Congress approves both through a second statute. Congressional approval of
the agreement is highly constrained by the fast track procedure, under which Congress can
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Ackerman and Golove have argued that the original turn away
from the treaty form, requiring supermajoritarian Senate approval,
and towards the congressional-executive agreement, requiring simple
majorities in the Senate and the House, was justified because it was
accompanied by a period of wide and deep popular deliberation.62 In
their inquiry into the constitutionality of the congressional-executive
agreement, Ackerman and Golove adopt the theory of constitutional
moments of "higher lawmaking" to argue that, although the
congressional-executive agreement broke from constitutional
tradition, it was constitutionally legitimate because it was endorsed by
a "constitutional consensus." 63 This consensus resulted from a shift in
the "considered judgments of Americans" following World War II
away from isolationism.64 In impressive historical detail, Ackerman
and Golove recount how scholars, statesmen, and citizens
participated in a full-on public constitutional debate that ended in the
popularly endorsed "constitutional solution" that authorized the
substitution of the congressional-executive agreement for the treaty.65
According to Ackerman and Golove, no such popular
referendum accompanied the modifications established by the Trade
Act of 1974,66 even though they describe the Trade Act as the final
and crucial component of the internationalist transformation of
federal government begun by the introduction of the congressional-
executive agreement.67 Rather, they acknowledge that the Trade Act
resulted from a professional effort to design a "highly sophisticated
tool for modern diplomacy," rather than from any popular
consensus.68 Yet international negotiations under the Trade Act have
been much more extensive than anything contemplated in the early
negotiations that had been ratified through the original and more
open-ended congressional-executive agreement form. This
substantial expansion of the regulatory power of international
economic organizations made them much more important to
consider the agreement and statement of administrative action for a limited period of
time, but can only vote it "up" or "down" and cannot amend it.
62- See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 20, at 835-74.
63. IM at 801-05.
64. Id at 813.
65. Id. at 861-96.
66. Id at 904-07.
67. See iUL at 803 ("The Trade Act of 1974 made a comprehensive effort to restructure
the modem two-House procedure to suit the needs of economic diplomacy.").
68. Id. at 904.
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everyday life at the very same time that the opportunity to debate and
discuss their implications declined.69
As a result, the Trade Act resolved the crisis in American
internationalism of the early 1970s, but virtually guaranteed that the
crisis would return. As the streamlining procedures of the Trade Act
were used to curtail popular debate on increasingly expansive
agreements, popular concern about both the procedure and substance
of these agreements increased, reaching a fever pitch at the second
Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 1999 in Seattle. Popular
concern has in turn fueled congressional discomfort with the Trade
Act. Significantly, Congress has refused since 1995 to authorize the
use of the Trade Act mechanism, despite repeated appeals by the
President.70
All of this suggests that another crisis in American
internationalism is upon us. The need to manage globalization has
generated international economic organizations of unprecedented
regulatory power. The United States has committed itself to adhere
to the rules and ruling of these organizations, creating a de facto
international branch of federal government. The procedural
mechanism by which the United States has made these commitments,
however, was designed for international economic organizations
whose power was much narrower in scope and much less
authoritative. Popular demand has increased for a fundamental
reevaluation of the proper relationship of the United States to the
international order. Thus, according to the methodology employed
by Ackerman and Golove, the public has not extended the consensus
69. See supra pp. 14-15 for a discussion of the regulatory function.
70. See, e.g., E. J. Dionne Jr., The Revolt Against Fast Track, WASH. POST, Nov. 7,
1997, at A25 (portraying the frustrations of Rep. Nita Lowey over the fast track issue as
representative of many congresspersons); Paul Magnusson, Why Fast Track May Be Going
Nowhere, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 1997, at 50 (describing increasing hesitations from many
congresspersons in the face of sustained public and interest-group opposition). For
examples of decisions by particular congresspersons to oppose fast track, see Fast-Track
Trade Authority, 143 CONG. REC. E2372 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Costello); Opposition to Fast-Track Legislation in Current Form, 143 CONG. REC. E2346
(daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Roemer); Fast Track, 143 CONG. REC. E2338
(daily ed. Nov. 12, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kaptur); Fast-Track Legislation, 143 CONG.
REC. S12456 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ford); Stand up for America:
Defeat Fast Track, 143 CONG. REC. H10424 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Kucinich); Fast Track Authority, 143 CONG. REC. E2141 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Waxman); Fast Track Is the Wrong Track, 143 CONG. REC. E1948
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Rep. Lipinski); The True Impacts of NAFTA on the
U.S. Economy, 143 CONG. REC. E1719 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1997) (statement of Rep.
DeFazio).
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that informally ratified the establishment of the congressional-
executive agreement after World War II to agreements like that
establishing the WTO.
In short, globalization has generated a "constitutional moment."
As yet, however, no constitutional consensus has emerged as to how
United States participation in the international regulatory response to
globalization-the international branch of United States
government-should look. As a consequence, the international
"constitutional moment"-the popular deliberation and ratification
of the process used to construct the international branch-remains
incomplete.
III. Constitutional Indeterminacy and Democratic Values
In a world where capital and goods.., flow across national
boundaries with unprecedented ease, politics must assume
transnational, even global forms, if only to keep up.7'
If no constitutional consensus has emerged as to the appropriate
structure of the international branch of federal government, the
challenge becomes to define a framework for discourse that will
enable such a consensus. This challenge is fraught, however, with
uncertainty: uncertainty stemming from the Constitution, and
uncertainty in underlying democratic principles. Because this
uncertainty is particularly acute with respect to international affairs,
the task of constructing the international branch is difficult and
complex. At the same time, it uncovers a valuable opportunity for
public discourse. Ultimately, the construction project must engage
the public to succeed, and it must balance competing majoritarian and
countermajoritarian values in American constitutional democracy.
A. Constitutional Indeterminacy
The federal Constitution is indeterminate because its text is
susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation, and this
susceptibility cannot be resolved by referring to "objective" indicia.72
71. SANDEL, supra note 26, at 338-39.
72. An illustration by Mark Tushnet is useful here. Tushnet takes on the
constitutional clause that is generally held up as the archetype of textual determinacy-the
requirement that the President be at least 35 years of age. Tushnet argues that "should
substantial political forces ever propel the presidential candidacy of a person who was 33
years old, arguments in favor of flexible interpretation of the presidential age requirement
would probably become credible." Mark Tushnet, Principles, Politics and Constitutional
Law, 88 MICH. L. REv. 49, 51 n.9 (1989); see also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND
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Consider, for example, the question whether the Constitution grants
individuals a right to privacy. An interpreter of the constitutional text
who, like John Ely or Cass Sunstein, is worried about the
"countermajoritarian difficulty," might adopt a "democracy-seeking"
interpretive lens, and accordingly constrain the finding of such a right
because it is not democracy-reinforcing. 73  Another kind of
"democracy-seeking" interpreter, such as Lawrence Lessig or Martin
Flaherty, might locate such a right because it preserves the value the
Founders placed on individual liberty.74  A "justice-seeking"
interpreter, such as Ronald Dworkin or Jim Fleming, might argue for
such an interpretation because such a value is necessary to a "moral
Constitution." 75 Each of these scholars can find ample support for his
interpretation in the text, history and structure of the Constitution.76
Each interpretation filters "objective," but indeterminate, textual,
structural, and historical facts through a lens of social, political and
constitutional values. Accordingly, much constitutional theory
recognizes that a particular interpretation of the Constitution can
only occur by considering the desired outcome.77
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61-62 (1988). Thus,
interpretive plausibility or lack thereof stems not only from the text itself but also from the
range of potential and plausible meanings at a given time. Cf Duncan Kennedy, Freedom
and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 526
(1986) (recognizing the constraint on judging imposed by the need to generate "plausible
legal arguments"). The difficulties that indeterminacy poses for the concept of objectively
identifiable meaning of any sort have been much discussed. See Mark Lilla, Tie Politics of
Jacques Derrida, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 25, 1998, at 36.
73. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 45 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1571 (1988). The distinction between "democracy-seeking" and "justice-seeking"
approaches is adapted from Abner Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 293, 295-97 (1996) (distinguishing between "rights-foundationalists" and
"democrats").
74. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165. 1180-93 (1993):
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996).
75. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211,247-56 (1993).
76. But cf generally Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (cautioning scholars to adopt rigorous
standards of historical research in their interpretive efforts).
77. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204, 211 (1980); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1085 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, The
Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,470 (1981).
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This indeterminacy has worked remarkably well, helping to make
the United States Constitution the longest-standing written
constitution.78 Inevitably, though, the very qualities that have allowed
the Constitution to remain relevant have also generated controversies
over how best to interpret it. Thus, indeterminacy is the
Constitution's strength and also its weakness. Indeterminacy allows
the Constitution to remain an authoritative guideline, preserving the
broad objectives of the Framers; yet it gives very little instruction for
how to resolve particular issues. As a consequence, the resolution is
political. The term "political" is not used here in a derogatory sense.
On the contrary, it is used to refer to the vital process of democratic
deliberation, that is, of considering and agreeing on desired values
and outcomes.
The Constitution gives less instruction on international
governance than it does on domestic governance. Moreover, the
stakes of agreeing to international governance-which include
transferring power outside national boundaries and away from the
national populace-are higher. Because there is so little
constitutional instruction on the proper relationship between United
States government and international law, political values and
discourse must play an especially important role. This is particularly
true because the international environment has changed dramatically
in the past few decades, and more than likely will continue to change
rapidly over the next few decades. As during the New Deal,
exigencies that were not contemplated by the Constitution's framers
have necessitated bold governmental innovation. Now, as with the
rise of domestic administrative law, the consequence is that the
question of the constitutionality of the new governmental structure
must be determined with minimal assistance from the constitutional
text. This era of change warrants a close re-examination of the
current regulatory framework.
Constitutional indeterminacy on how to proceed with such an
analysis manifests itself in textual silences, ambiguities, and
contradictions in several key constitutional provisions. To begin with
silence, the possibility of such an international regulatory body
appears nowhere in the Constitution, for the simple reason that the
Framers anticipated neither economic globalization, nor the need
78. Cf. H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR., THE POLrrIcAL ROLE OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 167 (1951) ("Constitutions that do not bend are very apt to break.").
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generated by globalization for an international economic regulatory
body with significant authority over the United States.
The Constitution does allocate relevant powers to the legislative
and executive branches of the federal government, but these
allocations only lead to ambiguity and contradiction, because they
seem to overlap. Article I gives Congress the power to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations. '79 Article II gives the President the
power "to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur. °80 The Constitution fails to specify whether the congressional
foreign commerce power includes or excludes (thereby leaving to the
President) the power to make international commercial agreements. 81
While the text allocates to Congress the power to regulate foreign
commerce, the only explicit allocation of the ability to make
international agreements lies in Article II's allocation of authority to
the President.82 Thus, Congress is involved because its regulatory
power over foreign commerce is implicated. The President is
involved because the President has the power to make international
agreements. Both branches are clearly implicated, but little
indication is given as to the appropriate division or coordination of
responsibilities. The structure that has emerged has been guided by a
strong sense of the importance of ensuring the viability of American
internationalism. Both the congressional-executive agreement and
the "fast track" procedure for enacting it are structures that have
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
81. Indeed, the executive branch has suggested that the President is endowed with the
constitutional authority to make such agreements free from congressional oversight. The
extreme unpopularity of this view with Congress, however, has prevented Presidents from
pressing it, at least since the 1960s. Prior to that period, however, there were marked
struggles between President and Congress on this issue, many of which related to the
GAT. To begin with, the text of the GATT" was never congressionally ratified, either as
a treaty or as a congressional-executive agreement (that is, not until the Uruguay Round).
Congress resented this oversight for some time. Another well-known example of this
tension comes from the so-called "Kennedy Round" of negotiations among members of
the GATT?. Congress had enacted a statute authorizing President Kennedy only to make
tariff concessions. The President returned from the negotiations, however, with
agreements regulating the "non-tariff" matters of anti-dumping law and customs
valuation. Congress responded by refusing to adopt the agreements, causing some
international comment. The fast track procedure was devised largely as a response to this
and other incidences of congressional recalcitrance.
82. Of course, these clauses can just as easily be read as not contradictory. In fact, this
reading is predominant, and necessary to justify the edifice of trade legislation via
congressional-executive agreements.
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molded indeterminate constitutional guidelines in such a way as to
maximize efficacy and expediency in foreign affairs lawmaking.
(1) The Congressional-Executive Agreement
As discussed above, the congressional-executive agreement was a
product of the post-World War II American commitment to
internationalism, and had no obvious basis in constitutional text,
structure, or history.8 3 Yet international law scholars such as Edwin
Corwin, Wallace McClure, Myres McDougal, and Ascher Lans
produced exhaustive and persuasive textual, structural, and historical
arguments that congressional-executive agreements were
constitutionally valid instruments for foreign affairs lawmaking.s4
Because text, structure, and history could be mobilized to support
either side of the debate,85 they were necessary but not sufficient in
determining its outcome. That outcome-the endorsement of the
congressional-executive agreement-resulted from a recognition that,
without it, the ability of the United States government to conduct
foreign policy effectively, and therefore fully to inhabit its new role as
world leader, would be jeopardized.8 6 Courts were generally content
to defer to this political solution, and did so by privileging the value of
international efficacy in their jurisprudence. s7
The issue was raised anew, however, when Congress considered
the agreements establishing the WTO and NAFTA in the mid-1990s.
The renewed interest in the constitutional question resulted from a
recognition that both organizations would exercise authority much
broader and stronger than any other international organization in
which the U.S. had been involved up to that point. When the issue
83. See supra pp. 16-18.
84. See generally Edward S. Corwin, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD
ORGANIZATION (1944); Wallace McClure, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1941);
Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE LJ. 181, 534 (1945).
For a detailed discussion of this scholarship, see Ackerman & Golove, supra note 20, at
866-73.
85. Compare Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty, 53
YALE L.J. 664 (1945), with McDougal & Lans, supra note 84, at 181.
86. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 20, at 875-89.
87. See HENKIN, supra note 41, at 2 (recounting "the Supreme Court's... prudential
avoidance of 'political questions"' in foreign affairs law); see also Ackerman & Golove,
supra note 20, at 925 ("Over the past half-century ... the [Supreme] Court has been
extremely deferential on foreign affairs, allowing Congress and the President to fight out
their constitutional battles on their own terms."); Paul, supra note 42, at 717.
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was revived, constitutional scholars argued both sides. Larry Tribe
argued that the text and structure of the Constitution compel a
conclusion that the congressional-executive agreement form is
unconstitutional.88 Bruce Ackerman and David Golove countered
that the validity of the congressional-executive agreement derives
from the "constitutional moment" arising out of strong public support
for American internationalism following World War 11.89 Congress
inquired into and debated the constitutionality of the form in its
deliberations over both the WTO and NAFTA. 90 Ultimately,
however, these inquiries were put aside because of overwhelming
pressure to approve the agreement.91 As with the last round of
debates over the issue, the Supreme Court has remained silent.
Since then, however, public concern has increased about both the
substance of these agreements and the machinery used to ratify
them.92 The Trade Act mechanism forestalled the public debate on
these agreements, but could not prevent them altogether. As public
concern has increased, it has also emboldened congressional
resistance to the current arrangement, as evidenced by Congress's
repeated refusal to renew presidential negotiating authority despite
an economic environment of unprecedented prosperity. 93
(2) The Delegation of Regulatory Power
In a congressional-executive agreement, Congress delegates the
power to make rules governing foreign commerce to the President,
who in turn delegates them, subsequent to congressional ratification,
to an international organization. This "double delegation" arguably
is more extreme than any delegation of congressional power in the
domestic context. In its original form, however, Congress had an
opportunity to engage in open-ended debates over agreements
88. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223-28 (1995).
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S15104 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Byrd) ("It is my belief that the approval mechanism that ought to have been used,
especially for the WTO portion of the GATT agreement, is the constitutional procedure
for treaty ratification."), 139 CONG. REC. H9953 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Gonzalez) ("NAFTA will undermine the fundamental constitutional principle of a
balance of powers among three coequal branches of government by transferring functions
from one branch of government to another.").
91. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
92. See supra p. 18.
93. See Sander M. Levin, Why Fast Track Failed, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1997, at A25:
see also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 20, at 904.
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submitted for its approval, making congressional ratification of these
early agreements relatively meaningful. The innovation of the fast
track procedure with the Trade Act of 1974, however, has rendered
congressional approval of subsequent agreements largely pro forma.
The short period of time before the vote that the agreement becomes
available to congressional review, together with the sheer volume and
complexity of the proposed agreements, makes meaningful
congressional review much more difficult. Consequently, although
Congress technically reserves the right to reject implementing
legislation, rejection is highly improbable under the Trade Act
mechanism. Members of Congress are therefore virtually compelled
to ratify contemporary trade agreements, as even their proponents
have recognized.94 The senior Senator Robert Byrd issued this
condemnation during the debates over the agreement implementing
United States obligations under the World Trade Organization:
"Fast track" is nothing more than a quick shuffle designed to ram
through this agreement without much scrutiny. Therefore, Mr.
President, here we are at this late hour, faced with an upcoming
vote on a matter about which we know little and under such
restrictions as will limit debate and tie our legislative hands with
respect to amendments, leaving us only with a choice of voting this
important legislation up or down.95
The text of the Constitution offers no definitive answer to the
question of whether this highly constrained legislative mode is valid.
The value of preserving political efficacy, however, has caused courts
to stay out of the issue. This judicial deference stems from a belief in
the priority of international effectiveness- "expediency" -in foreign
affairs lawmaking. 96
"Expediency" jurisprudence began with judicial construction of
an "inherent" foreign affairs lawmaking power accruing to the
President.97 This was the view espoused by the Supreme Court in
94. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 168 ("The Fast Track critics' most persuasive critique is of the
President's tactic of bundling disparate trade proposals... and placing them before
Congress for a single vote. Taken to extremes, they argue, bundling makes it too painful
for Congress to vote against a completed trade accord .... ").
95. 140 CONG. REC. S15104 (daily ed. Nov. 30,1994) (statement of Sen. Byrd); see also
137 CONG. REC. S6777 (daily ed. May 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (describing
fast track as a "gun at our heads").
96. See Paul, supra note 42, at 715.
97. As Louis Henkin has noted, the term "foreign affairs" is not to be found in the
constitutional text, it has long been used to apply to the power to conduct affairs, both
November 2000] INTERNATINAL G OVERNMENT
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., a 1936 case involving a
congressional delegation to the President of authority to prohibit
arms sales to certain countries.98 Here, the Court finessed a move
from the assertion that "inherent" foreign affairs powers
constitutionally accrue to the federal government to the conclusion
that these powers accrue specifically to the Executive branch, on the
grounds that it was important that the United States "speak with one
voice" in foreign affairs. In doing so, Curtiss-Wright established the
view elevating the value of "executive expediency" as paramount in
international lawmaking. 99
Curtiss-Wright's approval of legislative delegation to the
President, as well as its dictum describing sweeping "inherent"
presidential foreign affairs power, might be distinguishable from the
modern international trade organization, however. The Curtiss-
Wright Court focused on foreign affairs in the context of international
war,100 rather than international commerce. Yet the Supreme Court
has upheld legislative delegations in international commerce as well.
In J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a
statute in which Congress delegated to the President the power to fix
tariffs for the purpose of equalizing the prices of foreign imports and
domestic goods in domestic markets. 10 1
Indeed, Congress has had a long history of delegating to the
President its authority to set tariffs. These delegations sought not
only to realize the policy at issue in the J.W. Hampton case of tariff
diplomatic and legal, of the United States in the international realm. See HENKIN, supra
note 41, at 251.
98. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
99. The "inherent" presidential power to negotiate international agreements is not
allocated in the text, but was established in Curtiss-Wright. Id. at 315-17.
100. Id. at 315, 318 (stating that powers that fall "within the category of foreign affairs"
as "powers of external sovereignty" are the "powers to declare and wage war
[notwithstanding art. I, § 8, cl. 11], to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties").
101. 276 U.S. 394, 401 (1928). The Tariff Act of September 21, 1922 (the "flexible tariff
provision") provided that
in order to regulate the foreign commerce of the United States and to put into
force and effect the policy of Congress by this act intended, whenever the
President, upon investigation of the differences in costs of production of articles
wholly or in part the growth or product of the United States and of like or similar
articles wholly or in part the growth or product of competing foreign countries
shall find that tariffs do not equalize the cost of production between that in the
US and that in other countries, he shall raise or decrease the rate in order to
"equalize the same."
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"equalization" of import prices with domestic prices, but also the
policy of "reciprocal trade" - that is, of allowing foreign producers
benefits from trade in the United States only to the extent that U.S.
producers were allowed to benefit from trade in foreign countries. In
the latter category, such delegations began in the form of authorizing
the President to modify tariffs unilaterally in response to tariff
modifications, either increases or decreases, by foreign nations. 1°2 In
the 1930s, they became authorizations allowing the President to
modify tariffs via bilateral "reciprocal trade agreements.' 0 3 Curtiss-
Wright, J.W. Hampton, and their progeny all indicate a foreign affairs
jurisprudence that views effectiveness in the international sphere with
utmost priority.1°4
102. In The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383-84 (1809), the Supreme Court
upheld the Act of March 1, 1809, expiring on May 1,1810, forbidding importation of goods
from Great Britain and France provided that the President, by proclamation, is authorized
to revoke or modify these restrictions with these countries if they "revoke[d] or
modifi[ed]" their trade laws "as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of
the United States." On May 10, 1810, Congress passed another law declaring that if Great
Britain or France revoked or modified their trade laws "as that they shall cease to violate
the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President of the United States
shall declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not" then certain restrictions in
the 1809 act would be revived. In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 700 (1892), the Supreme
Court upheld the Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, chap. 1244, 26 Stat. 567. The Act imposed
tariffs on woolen dress goods, apparel, silk embroideries and laces, and colored cotton
cloths, but provided that the President could suspend provisions of the Act allowing duty-
free entry of certain goods and levy duties on such goods as provided by statute, if he finds
that the exporting country has imposed duties on U.S.-made like goods that "he may deem
reciprocally unequal and unreasonable."
103. See The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat.
943 (1934) (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354).
104. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 41, at 174-77. There has been one case complaining
about the fast track procedure, which was dismissed. See Made in the USA Found. v.
United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1250-73 (N.D. Ala. 1999). To say that the Supreme
Court will likely never rule on the fast track procedure is not then to conclude that
constitutional theory is irrelevant, although that is one interpretation. The other
possibility is a question of constitutional interpretation that the Court views as a "political
question," better left to resolution by the political branches. Mark Tushnet, Principles,
Politics and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 49, 80 (1989) (defending "the
proposition that in cases involving separation of powers, the Constitution adopts a scheme
of pure procedural justice: whatever results from the operation of the political process is
constitutionally acceptable"). For a discussion of the tension between the "political
questions doctrine" and the interpretive supremacy claimed by the Supreme Court in
Marbury v. Madison, see id at 60-61, 68-80. Many commentators have advocated
nonjudicial resolution of separation of powers questions. Id.; HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETrER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS 163-73 (1962).
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And yet, there is a strain of Supreme Court jurisprudence that is
less passive toward areas implicating foreign affairs, when they also
implicate issues of domestic law.10 5 First, contemporary delegations
of trade legislation authority are quite different from those discussed
in J.W. Hampton. Modern trade agreements require legislation in
areas that have historically been understood as domestic rather than
international. They explicitly mandate, for example, modifications of
domestic government procurement law,106 environmental protection
law relating to domestic environmental regulation, 10 7 health and
safety regulation relating to domestic consumption, 10 8  and
intellectual property rights for domestic property rights holders. 10 9 At
105. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952), steel
companies brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Secretary of
Commerce from seizing steel mills in conjunction with an Executive Order which sought
to take over steel mills in the middle of a work stoppage and labor dispute between
companies and the United Steelworkers of America. Congress had provided for seizure of
real and personal property under two statutes (the Selective Service Act of 1948 and the
Defense Production Act of 1950), but the conditions for those statutes were not met in this
case. Id. at 587-601.
In United States v. Guy Capps, 204 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1953), the Fourth Circuit
voided an executive agreement which contradicted tariff policy set by Congress and the
Tariff Commission. This case suggested that foreign affairs power does not extend to
trade issues or at least "foreign commerce"; however, it expressly left aside this issue (i.e.,
whether the Executive could make trade agreements when there is congressional silence)
since here there was contradictory legislative policy. In that sense the case is similar to
Youngstown. However, the court decided the case on other grounds, and may have
thought that the executive in fact did possess an inherent power to sign trade agreements.
See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 105-06.
The cases upholding the executive branch's exercise of the foreign affairs power were
Dames & Moore v. Regan and Consumers Union v. Kissinger. In Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981), the issue was perhaps distinguishable from Youngstown
on the grounds that it was (1) partially specifically authorized, (2) partially not directly
conflicting with, but rather incidental to, a legislative policy, (3) it was not an important
internal economic area, and (4) there was legislation which, although it did not expressly
delegate, it was congruent with policies underlying the President's actions in the present
case. Also, the part not expressly authorized was an "executive practice."
106. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Government Procurement.
107. See WTO Report of the Panel, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (29 January 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) (complaints by
Venezuela (WT/DS2) and Brazil (WT/DS4) in 1995).
108. Several federal harmonization measures resulting from NAFTA may have reduced
domestic requirements for ensuring disease-free meat. Some argue that, in addition to
such explicit modifications, trade agreements eventually impact the regulatory scheme in a
much more fundamental way, by increasing international pressure to liberalize.
109. For example, the WTO extended the term of protection granted by U.S. patent law
from 17 to 20 years, but made it start from the date of filing rather than the date of grant.
Domestic intellectual property groups were bitterly critical of this measure, arguing that it
significantly reduced their actual term of protection. This dissatisfaction was predicted by
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least with respect to these areas, the fast track procedure cannot only
be understood as an exercise of the foreign commerce power, but also
as a delegation of domestic commerce power, and consequently
properly subject to higher levels of congressional participation.
Support for such an approach lies in the 1952 case Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in which the Supreme Court overturned
an Executive Order issued by President Truman to preempt the
lengthy resolution by processes established through the National
Labor Relations Act of a domestic labor dispute in the steel industry.
The Order seized steel mills and directed production to ensure raw
materials critical to the U.S.'s military campaign in Korea.110 In
Youngstown, the Supreme Court defied the argument of international
expediency. Justice Frankfurter expressed this sentiment in his
concurrence:
A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times feels the lack
of power to act with complete, all-embracing, swiftly moving
authority. No doubt a government with distributed authority...
labors under restrictions from which other governments are free. It
has not been our tradition to envy such governments. In any event
our government was designed to have such restrictions. The price
was deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these
restrictions afford.'
Youngstown involved an executive order which exceeded the
instructions of Congress as laid out in other statutory delegations. It
could be argued that a President who contravened congressional
expectations underlying his initial grant of trading authority would
have exceeded his authority in a similar way.
Sparse constitutional instruction has left an open field on which
to construct the international branch of government. Courts have
elected not to intervene in the results of this construction project.
And yet, from time to time, contrary movements emerge in the
courts' constitutional interpretation. The resolution of indeterminate
constitutional text has been guided not primarily by the text itself, but
rather by weighing the value of efficacy in international affairs against
competing values. These values-and the tension between them-are
Joel R. Reidenberg, Trade, TRIPPS and NAFTA, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 283, 284 (1993) ("Because the final GATT and NAFTA texts will necessarily
contain compromises on substantive standards, American industry is likely to have
objections .... ).
110. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,603 (1952).
Ill. Id. at 613.
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deeply rooted in democratic principles. In particular, this tension in
constitutional interpretation is intimately related to a tension within
American democracy between competing conceptualizations of the
public good.112
B. Competing Concepts of the Public Good
Opponents of the WTO have objected most immediately to
actions it has taken that conflict with particular policy goals, such as
protecting the environment or preserving human rights. 113 But a
deeper objection, one in which the policy objections are almost
always framed, is that the WTO has acted undemocratically, because
there is little or no access to WTO decisionmaking fora either by
legislative representatives or by members of the public.114
The absence of public access to or representation in the WTO
would seem to support the conclusion that the WTO is
antidemocratic. An investigation of American democratic theory,
112. While writers outside the critical tradition may find this possibility defeatist.
critical theory views it as the only real step towards resolution, since it is the only step that
acknowledges the truth (according to critical theory) that all constitutional theory is
"always and already" politicized anyway. See, e.g., Robin West, Progressive and
Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 712 (1990) ("Rather than discuss
our divergent attitudes toward social and private power, modern constitutionalists who
have abandoned pretensions to constitutional neutrality avoid politics and ethics by
discussing instead their manifestations in conflicting jurisprudential conceptions.").
Of course, this position also deprivileges the legal academic, since it renders the
question a political one rather than a constitutional one. This problem has been
encountered by other writers employing a critical method of constitutional interpretation.
Mark Tushnet aptly described this dilemma in an essay on another aspect of the
separation of powers doctrine (namely, the requirement of Senate confirmation of
Supreme Court nominees):
The analysis developed here suggests that this legal scholar may then be caught
in a rhetorical trap. For his or her prescriptions to be taken seriously, they must
be cast in terms of constitutional requirements. Yet, as I have argued, all the
Constitution really requires is that politics be given its ordinary range of
operation .... In the end, then, there may indeed be no distinctive contribution
that legal scholars can make ... except, of course, that academic lawyers have
peculiar rhetorical resources and have come to occupy positions of influence in
discussions of constitutional structure. To that extent, an academic lawyer who
adopts the model of the Sophist can continue to offer policy prescriptions that
will be taken seriously. Whether that is an admirable model has been
controverted since Socrates.
Tushnet, supra note 72, at 81. Tushnet might find a more compelling constitutional case
against the fast track procedure, however, since it seems to reduce the "ordinary range of
operation" of politics.
113. See supra Part II.
114. See supra Part II.
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however, disallows such an easy condemnation, because a significant
strand of democratic theory endorses avoiding direct forms of public
participation when doing so is necessary to preserve the public
interest. This section of the Article explains the sources of this
theoretical strand, and why it holds particularly strongly in economic
policy.
(1) The Tension Between "Public Preferences" and "Public Interest"
"Democracy" translates literally to "rule by the people."'" 5 This
definition can be developed in opposite directions, and the opposition
follows from an elemental tension in Western theory, between what
might be called the "is" and the "ought."'" 6 This tension poses the
115. The word derives from the Greek roots demos (people) and kratia (rule or
authority). See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 3 (1989)
[hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRACY]; JAMES L. HYLAND, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 40 (1995); Michael Seward, Democratic Theory and
Indices of Democratization, in DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY 6, 6 (David
Beetham ed., 1994). Crucial to the ancient Greek notion of democracy was the idea that
people would actually take turns governing. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Trevor J.
Saunders ed., T.A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1981) ("A basic principle of the democratic state
is liberty.... 'Ruling and being ruled in turn' is one element in liberty."). Modern
democratic theory has excised the commitment to ruling-in-turn, instead identifying
democratic government as government legitimated through popular consent. For classical
definitions of this "social contract," see JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) and JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762). For
manifestations in American political culture, see, for example, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments... [derive] their Just powers from
the consent of the governed...."). The definitional difference between ancient and
modem Western theory is generally attributed to the increased size and heterogeneity of
the modern electorate, and the increased complexity of modern government. See DAHL,
DEMOCRACY, supra, at 24-33. Thus, the principles of openness and public participation,
while still central to most contemporary democratic theories, do not translate in modern
versions to a mandate that the electorate rule in turn and are instead viewed as necessary
for the proper formulation and registration of popular consent or governmental
accountability. For a narrower conception of democracy which eschews openness and
public participation and rests only on popular election, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 262 (1976).
116. The best-known theory of the relationship between "is" and "ought" is Hume's
"naturalistic fallacy," which posits that "ought" cannot be derived from "is." DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1978) (1739-40). This fallacy is commonly referenced in rights discourse exploring
the relationship between positivism and natural law. See, e.g., George C. Christie, On the
Moral Obligation to Obey the Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1990). I do not explore the
naturalistic fallacy in this Article, since I am using the terms descriptively rather than
normatively. The relation of the terms to theory about government is most commonly
found in works on communitarianism. See, e.g., Jeffrey Friedman, The Politics of
Communitarianism, 8 CRITICAL REV. 297 (1994).
November 2000] INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
question whether government should reflect what the popular will
is-that is, public preferences-or what the popular will ought to
beit7 -the public interest. This further develops into a tension
between, on the one hand, reflecting the aggregate actual preferences
of the electorate,118 and even more specifically, of a majority of the
electorate; 119 and, on the other hand, requiring a determination of the
public interest,120 often as reached through the deliberations of a
governing elite. 121 As a result of this tension, democratic theory does
117. There are various relationships between the "is" and the "ought" here. For
example, both pluralism and republicanism in American democratic theory hold that the
best government allows a fairly direct expression of preferences by the electorate. Thus,
during the Founding period republicans favored a more direct version of democratic
government than that proposed by the Federalists; and in our own time, pluralists have
advocated the same in opposition to those who would insulate government from the
electorate. However, pluralists and republicans take very different views of the
relationship between "is" and "ought." Republicanism invests in the existing or potential
virtue of the electorate and believes that the actual preferences of the electorate will
coincide with a government that embodies higher virtues. Pluralism, a descendant of
utilitarianism and therefore of liberalism, does not posit that electoral preferences will
coincide with any prior notion of the good, but attaches normative value to the capacity of
the electorate to register preferences regardless of whether these preferences coincide
with a prior notion of the good. But see WILFRED BINKLEY & MALCOM MOOS, A
GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 7, 8 (1950) (contending that aggregate preferences
will actually accord with a prior or independent notion of the public good). The
relationship between the "is" and the "ought" illuminates the inquiry of political theorists
into a democratic society that may achieve "justice." See generally JOHN RAWLS. A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1975). Note also that because pluralism is an incarnation of
liberalism, this dichotomy also roughly maps on to the liberalism-republicanism divide in
political and constitutional theory. See, e.g., Morton Horwitz, Republicanism and
Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987). For
a critique of this dichotomy, see Sunstein, supra note 73, at 1571.
118. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956)
[hereinafter DAHL, PREFACE]; JACK LIVELY, DEMOCRACY (1975).
119. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 118; 1 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 220 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1862) (1835) ("[T]he majority
governs in the name of the people ... in all countries in which the people are supreme.").
For criticism of the majoritarian viewpoint, see, for example, JOHN STUART MILL,
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 102-07 (Currin V. Shields ed..
Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1861). This Article does not explore the meaning of the term
"preference." Some controversy exists over the nature of preferences. In particular, Cass
Sunstein has maintained that preferences do not exist prior to the political process. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and Shifting Preferences, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 196
(John Murphy ed., 1992).
120. See generally PLATO, The Republic, in THE COLLECrED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
575 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1963); MILL, supra
note 119; ROUSSEAU, supra note 115.
121. Of course, that an elite will rule in the public interest is a normative assumption.
See WILLIAM ALTON KELSO, AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: PLURALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 49-53 (1978); Currin V. Shields, Introduction to MILL, supra note 119, at xxxi-
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endorse, if counterintuitively, the notion of a governing elite if the
elite has the public's best interests in mind. Preserving the
inalienability of individual rights necessary to sustaining a robust
democracy, such as the right to vote and the right of expression,
exemplifies this "democracy-reinforcing" countermajoritarianism.
The conceptual tension between public preferences and the
public interest is also exemplified by the equivocal treatment by
American democratic theory of the values of governmental openness
and public participation. 22 On the one hand, such values are
manifestly necessary to ensure democratic government, since they
help to effectuate the public's expression of its preferences. These
principles are, as such, foundational to American democratic
theory.'2 In contemporary democratic theory, both pluralism, as the
predominant strand of modem American democratic theory, and its
rival, often described as "civic republicanism," value the principles of
openness and public participation, albeit for different reasons. 2 4
xxxii. Moreover, there is an important tradition of republicanism that does not stress the
importance of ruling elites but rather holds that the public interest can be reached by the
electorate themselves through the inculcation of civic virtue and citizen deliberation. I
wish to stress that I am not making any claims to the normative desirability of the
conceptions of democracy explored here. There are many conceptions of democracy that
compete with the liberal conception prevalent in American theory. See, e.g., N. SCOTT
ARNOLD, THE PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM: A CRITICAL
STUDY 34-64 (1994) (exploring concepts of economic democracy in socialism); Tracy
Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1657 (1997).
122. KELSO, supra note 121, at 7 (describing these values as common to rival political
theories such as "pluralism," "populism," and "participatory democracy"). The theory of
civic republicanism also stresses these values.
123. Scholars of this era locate these principles within an early "republican" American
political culture, stressing civic virtue and citizen deliberation. See generally JACKSON
TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1961);
FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUN: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1985); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975);
HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (Murray Dry ed.,
1981); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787
(1969).
124. See generally EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE (1945); JAMES
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1958); DAHL,
PREFACE, supra note 118; ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); V.O. KEY, POLITICS,
PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS (1958); WILLIAM KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF
MASS SOCIETY (1959); CHARLES LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION-MAKING
(1962); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). Pluralism does not
embrace the principles of openness and political participation as much as other
contemporary theories such as participatory democracy. See generally ALAN ALTSHULER,
COMMUNITY CONTROL (1970); BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); MICHAEL HARRINGTON, TOWARD
A DEMOCRATIC LEFT (1968); JACK NEWFIELD & JEFF GREENFIELD, A POPULIST
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American democratic theory is characterized by a general orientation
towards the "is" side of the equation-that is, towards a
conceptualization of democracy that privileges the expression by the
electorate of its actual preferences, rather than one which seeks to
determine the public will through some other means.
At the same time, however, American democratic theory,
including contemporary pluralism and civic republicanism, recognizes
the importance of countervailing values in governance, such as
"efficiency," and "expertise" or "enlightenment.' 125 The orientation
toward openness and public participation, consequently, is partial.
Indeed, much of American democratic theory concerns itself precisely
with the question of the extent to which public preferences should be
tempered by the public interest in government. 126
MANIFESTO (1972); ROBERT P. WOLFF ET AL., A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE
(1965). Participatory democracy embraces a strong communitarian and decentralizing
bent and is more concerned with the socioeconomic bias in the current legislative process.
See, e.g., WOLFF ET AL., supra, at 3-53. Within legal and political scholarship, pluralism
has faced a significant challenge from a "revived republicanism." See Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminist Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543
(1986); Sunstein, supra note 73; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]. This tradition
has generally been opposed to contemporary pluralist theory because it does not envision
public preferences as existing prior to the lawmaking process (with the lawmaking process
merely aggregating them), but rather sees them as a result of deliberation on the public
good among the citizenry. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra, at 31.
125. See KELSO, supra note 121, at 7; see also THEODORE LoWi, THE END OF
LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); MILL, supra note 119, at 72-74, 83-84; SCHUMPETER, supra
note 115. I understand the terms "expertise" and "enlightenment" to describe different
manifestations of the phenomenon wherein a ruling elite is better equipped to decide in
the public interest. "Expertise" describes situations in which that superior decisionmaking
capacity stems from particular empirical knowledge. "Enlightenment" describes situations
in which the capacity stems not from any greater empirical knowledge but from a
disinterested ability to create policy which opposes current majority will but which, it is
believed, will further the long-term interests of society as a whole. It is interesting to note
that policy decisions traditionally viewed as "enlightened" can fall across the political
spectrum. Civil rights law, for example, is a well-known example of countermajoritarian
lawmaking. In the area of economic policy, however, countermajoritarian policy has
tended to be conservative, rather than liberal-that is, has tended to mean free-market
policy, while the majoritarian view has generally supported a more protective economic
policy. The values of democracy and efficiency have not always been viewed as contrary.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
949, 950 (1991).
126. The federalist view "willingly abandoned the classical republican understanding
that citizens should participate directly in the processes of government." Sunstein, Interest
Groups, supra note 124, at 42 & n.58; see also WOOD, supra note 123. Rather, the
federalists viewed all potential rulers, whether the general citizenry or a ruling elite, as
corruptible. Hence the famous statement that "ambition must be made to counteract
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(2) The Tension-As Related to Governmental Structure
The tension between public preferences and public interest
described above inhabits theory about constitutional structure.127
American constitutionalism posits the necessity of a framework both
to secure democratic government (for example, by disallowing
monarchical or other structures of government), and to constrain the
actions of any particular government, irrespective of popular will (for
example, by protecting individual rights against governmental
intrusion).128
The principle of representative government provides an
illustration of this tension. On the one hand, representation in
government ensures the expression of popular will. On the other
hand, pronounced strains in democratic theory from the Federalists
onward envision the principle of representation as providing a means
for constraining the popular will and preventing against the
"excesses" of direct democracy.129 Tensions within the principle of
representative government are commonly expressed as whether
elected legislators should serve as "representatives" of their
ambition." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Thus the Federalists, while
assuming the dominance of the electorate, sought to ensure that governmental structure
would protect not only individual rights but the "permanent... interests of the
community." See FEDERALIST No. 57 (Alexander Hamilton). The Federalists therefore
favored structure as a limit on democracy. Part of this structure included a means "to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the
common good of the society." Id
127. Attention to the constitutional text is particularly pronounced in American
political thought. See Albert Morris, Political Culture and the Constitution, in THE IDEA
OF DEMOCRACY 335 (John Murphy ed., 1992).
128. See ELY, supra note 73, at 45 (arguing that constitutionally protected rights
"reinforce" democracy by ensuring the preconditions for effective democracy); STEPHEN
HOLMES, THE MAJORITARIAN PARADOX 87-97 (1989). There is a separate strand of
constitutional theory that does not justify individual rights according to democratic theory,
but according to prior notions of the good. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the
Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L REv. 211, 247-56 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in CONSTrruTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
327 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
129. The Federalists' view:
When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at
variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have
appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary
delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate
reflection.
THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 49
(James Madison); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 124, at 50-56. The establishment
of an electoral college for the election of the Senate and the President is another good
example.
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constituencies, acting in perfect reflection of the actual preferences of
those constituencies; or as "delegates," charged with determining the
best interests of constituencies even if they depart from
constituencies' preferences.1 30 Even more controversial is delegation
outside the legislature to entities which may or may not be electorally
accountable-for example, in the area of trade legislation.
(3) The Tension -As Related to Economic Policy
Trade policy exemplifies the tension between public preferences
and the public interest, because the very basis of trade-liberalization
policy lies in the self-consciously "counterintuitive" principle of
comparative advantage.131 The principle of comparative advantage
holds that by increasing vulnerability to extranational market
competition, societies increase their benefits from trade even if they
are less competitive in overall terms than other societies. That this
proposition is "counterintuitive" is borne out by the fact that, by
generally used measures, policies that favor more rather than less
trade liberalization are almost always anti-majoritarian. Opinion
polls, for instance, consistently show a majority position against
lowering national trade barriers. 132 Presidents are arguably elected
despite, rather than because of, their positions on trade.133 And
Congress consistently favors more rather than less protection against
international market competition. Indeed, the brand of American
politics that emerged in the late nineteenth century under the rubric
of "populism" is known primarily for its advocacy of anti-
liberalization economic policy.
Free trade advocates respond to this majoritarian stance against
trade liberalization by arguing that it is nonetheless in the public
interest (because it increases national wealth and consumer choice).
130. Within the legislature, controversy surrounds the proper scope of authority of
legislative committees. While it has received less attention, the issue of legislative
committees in some ways poses at least as strong a challenge to democratic principles as
extra-legislative delegation. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT:
A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1956); Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The
Nondelegation Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 73 (1999).
131. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. For another discussion of democracy
and international trade, see generally Jeffery Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes:
Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice, and International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 229
(1998).
132. See supra note 44.
133. See Chantal Thomas, Democracy in the Fast Lane: The Debate over Fast Track
Trade Legislation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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In doing this, free trade advocates fall squarely within a well-
established tradition of privileging a vision of the public interest over
public preferences.134
If free trade is in the public interest despite being contrary to
public preference, then a governmental structure which delegates the
task of trade policy formulation to entities more capable of acting in a
countermajoritarian fashion is preferred over one in which actors are
more closely beholden to direct expression of public preferences.
Consequently, countermajoritarianism in trade policy can claim
justification in democratic theory.135  More generally, tensions
discussed above in constitutional interpretation and between
democratic principles explain why the WTO and other international
trade organizations can claim legitimacy despite their isolation from
the public.
The constitutional "discourse of executive expediency,"'136 and
the countermajoritarian allegiance to the "public interest" over public
preferences, may well have been essential to laying the groundwork
for the international branch of government. That groundwork,
however, is now securely established. As a consequence, the time is
right to reexamine the balance between the norm of governmental
expediency, and the value of openness and accountability in
international government.
IV. The Way Forward: Striking a Balance
If we do not do better in the future-if the global system continues
to generate growing inequality, environmental destruction, and a
134. A majority of the Federalists were pro-free trade, with some notable exceptions
such as Alexander Hamilton. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
MACROECONOMICS 362 (15th ed. 1995).
135. Civil rights is another prominent area. It is interesting to note that, in economic
discourse the countermajoritarian stance falls on the opposite end of the political spectrum
from the countermajoritarian stance in rights discourse. That is, strong pro-free trade
positions are generally associated with political conservatism, while strong pro-rights
positions are generally associated with political liberalism or progressivism. Conversely,
weaker rights positions are associated with political conservatism, whereas weaker free
trade positions are associated with political liberalism or conservatism. All of this points
to a consistency of political viewpoint, but not of theory or method, and supports my claim
of, and support for, indeterminacy. By "support for," I mean a support for explicitly
prioritizing political outcomes in theoretical discourse.
136. See Paul, supra note 42, at 671.
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race to the bottom for working people-then I can assure you, it
will generate broad opposition that will make Seattle look tame.1
37
The construction of the fourth branch began, but did not end,
with the massive legislative delegations of the 1920's and 1930's.
Substantial modifications of the administrative process continued well
afterwards.138  In particular, concerns about accountability and
transparency led to efforts to define a clear role for judicial review
and to establish "procedural safeguards" through guidelines for
formal agency adjudication and rulemaking. 139  Such efforts
generated, for example, the 1946 enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 40
Similarly, the construction of the international branch began with
the massive delegations of the 1990's to the WTO and NAFTA; but
there remains much to do to ensure that the international branch
sufficiently reflects the values of American constitutional democracy.
Just as the structure and process of administrative law continued to be
refined after the establishment of administrative agencies as a
significant source of law, the structure and process of international
economic law must continue to be reexamined and modified to
incorporate the legitimate concerns of the populations it governs.
There are two levels at which the international branch of United
States government should become more transparent and accountable.
The first level is the process by which the United States joins an
international economic organization. At present, under the Trade
Act of 1974, the President receives authority, and broadly defined
instructions, from Congress to negotiate an international agreement.
The agreement is then brought back to Congress for review on the
"fast track," that is, within an expedited time frame and without
possibility of amendment.
The last two uses of the Trade Act, to implement the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization,
indicated that the breadth and complexity of this new generation of
organizations have overwhelmed the capacity of Congress to absorb
137. Prepared Testimony of John J. Sweeney, President, American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations: Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2000) (statement of John J. Sweeney during
hearing on the "Outcome of the WTO Ministerial in Seattle" on Feb. 8,2000).
138. DAVIS, supra note 31, at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 9; Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946).
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and evaluate them within the current framework. Moreover, the "all-
or-nothing" dimension creates enormous and even coercive pressure
on Congress to approve an agreement.
The question, then, becomes, how to modify this process to allow
for greater transparency and accountability in the process of entering
into international agreements, without undermining the efficacy of
the United States as an actor in the international community. From
the perspective of international plausibility, the prohibition of
congressional amendment to international agreements must remain
intact. A unilateral amendment by Congress to an international
agreement would upset a long, complicated, multilateral negotiation
process between heads of state, and undermine its viability.
Extending the time frame for Congress to evaluate the agreement is
also not the sole solution, because it would not by itself address
concerns about transparency and accountability.
A. Opening up the Legislative Process in International Economic Law
The best way forward, then, is to consider how the process of
international negotiations might itself be opened up, to allow broad
input during, rather than merely after, the formation of the
agreement. Just as domestic legislative processes are open to public
input, the processes of international rulemaking, currently closed to
the public, should also become more transparent. There are at least
two possible preliminary models. One would seek to increase direct
voter participation, along the lines of an innovation made by the
European Union: a European Parliament, elected directly by voters
in member countries. The other participatory model would seek to
increase participation through non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). This model has been followed by international
organizations, such as the United Nations and the International
Labor Organization, which have established extensive mechanisms
for consultation with and participation by non-governmental
organizations. 141 NGOs function as interest groups, providing more
141. For an account of the evolution of the role of NGOs in international public
institutions, see Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and
International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997). The germ for the
contemporary role lay in Article 71 of the United Nations Charter, which allowed the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (EcoSoc) to accord "consultative status" to
national (after consultation with home Government) and international nongovernmental
organizations. U.N. CHARTER art. 71; see also Charnovitz, supra, at 210. The United
Nations Economic and Social Council has established several categories of observer and
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information and a broader spectrum of political representation than
government actors might operate on otherwise.
A predictable objection here is that opening up the international
rulemaking process will render the process susceptible to capture by
interest groups much in the same way as has been attributed to
domestic legislatures. It would be naive, however, to believe that the
current process, though closed to the public, is immune from input by
interest groups. Rather, the current opacity likely only skews access
in favor of highly sophisticated and organized actors. To open up the
process is not, therefore, to create a problem of capture, but merely to
change, and probably improve, dynamics that already exist.
B. Opening up the Administration of International Economic Law
The second level of this construction project is the process by
which these international organizations administer rules once they are
created. Richard Shell has argued on civic republican grounds for
increased public participation in dispute settlement procedures under
the World Trade Organization. Shell has recommended a "Trade
Stakeholders Model" that
emphasizes direct participation in trade disputes not only by states
and businesses, but also by groups that are broadly representative
of diverse citizen interests. It also eschews reliance on any ideology
such as free trade theory to define an objective 'good' for global
society. Rather, the priorities for global society are open-ended
and subject to deliberation by those whose lives will be affected by
economic decisions. 142
consultative status, which accord nongovernmental organizations the rights to attend and
speak during EcoSoc meetings, make written submissions to EcoSoc, and obtain EcoSoc
documents. R. SYBESMA-KNOL, THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS
295 (1981). "Article 71 gave NGOs a hunting license to pursue involvement in the U.N.
beyond EcoSoc." Charnovitz, supra, at 256. United Nations organizations such as the
World Health Organization, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
and UNESCO accord NGOs consultative status. Id. at 254-56. In the United Nations
Environmental Programme, "nongovernmental observers representing both industry and
environmental organizations have been freely accredited as observers to formal
intergovernmental meetings, with the prerogative of speaking in formal meetings and the
entitlement freely to receive preparatory documentation." David A. Wirth, Public
Participation in International Processes: Environmental Case Studies at the National and
International Levels, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 29 (1996). As for other
international public institutions, in the International Labor Organization, delegates
representing "workers' and employers' organizations... are equal in total number to
those representing governments." Id. at 29-30.
142. See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 910 (1995) [hereinafter Shell,
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Shell observes that
individuals and NGOs will need to become more deeply involved in
the legislative process by which the world trade community creates
rules and standards-not just the adjudicative processes by which
these rules are applied... If the WTO legal system is to escape the
twin problems of over reliance on states to represent public
interests and over commitment to economic theory as the
foundation for a jurisprudence of world trade, it must evolve new
political mechanisms that will permit broader participation for
those affected by trade decisions. 43
Some, though very modest, movement has been made in this
direction. In the WTO, committees have been established for both
environmental and labor regulation. The most movement has been
made in the area of environmental regulation, in particular in the
WTO, and in no small part due to the initiative of environmental
NGOs.144 But the WTO is still quite closed to NGOs.145
Opening up international lawmaking is critical to ensuring the
legitimacy of the newly expanded international order. Legitimacy is
not complacency, however. To the contrary, latent controversies that
currently haunt the process would almost certainly come to the fore.
For example, one consequence of expanding politics at the
international level would likely be that, generally speaking,
representatives from Western countries would prefer higher levels of
"social" regulation than representatives from other countries. This is
because in many countries comparative advantage is constituted
significantly by a cost advantage that results partially from the
Trade Legalism]; see also G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and
Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 359 (1996).
143. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 142, at 922.
144. See James Cameron, The GATT and the Environment, in GREENING
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100, 102-03 (Phillippe Sands ed., 1993) (describing how the World
Wildlife Fund organization obtained a confidential draft of the agreements, sparking
international mobilization on environmental issues).
145. For example, the WTO had a symposium on trade facilitation that included groups
representing businesses, but not labor or consumers. WTO Symposium on Trade
Facilitation, Geneva, March 9-10, 1998. Represented were companies (from the US,
Federal Express, General Motors, General Electric Information Systems, Mattel),
industry groups, and business NGOs (International Chamber of Commerce, International
Air Transport Association, and the International Chamber of Shipping). See Major
Companies to participate in WTO Trade Facilitation Symposium, available at
http:l/wto.orglenglish/newsLe/pres98_e/pr93_e.htm; see also Steve Charnovitz, The
Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime, 126 INT'L LAB.
REV. 565,574-75 (discussing "long-term efforts to raise labor issues in GATT").
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relative absence of government restrictions on business, such as
minimum wage rates, maximum hour rates, workplace regulations,
environmental regulations, and so on. On the other hand, it is
possible that representatives from industrialized and non-
industrialized states would both endorse some regulatory initiatives,
such as raising levels of labor and environmental protection, or
protecting other functions of the welfare state. 146  Introducing
democratic politics 147 to the international sphere does not conclude
the effort to construct the international branch; but it does potentially
mark a new beginning.148
For internationalists, the specter of the 1930s haunts any
discussion of opening up the process of international lawmaking to
public input. During this interwar era, populist protectionism and
isolationism fueled hostile international policies of the United States,
Germany, France, and Britain, eventually facilitating the onset of the
second World War. The "Horrors of the 1930s" were precisely what
cemented the commitment to American internationalism that in turn
nourished the modern "discourse of executive expediency" in foreign
affairs law. Conventional wisdom within American international
legal scholarship is, consequently and rightly, acutely aware of the
protectionism and isolationism that often accompanies popular input.
Such awareness is heightened even further within human rights and
environmental law, where isolationist sentiments have seemed
146. See Globalisation Must Not Be at the Expense of People, Declaration of NGOs
attending the UNCTAD-IX Conference, in preparatory meetings in Midrand, South
Africa, April 24-28, 1996 ("The uncontrolled spread of globalization and liberalization
cannot be accepted passively as inevitable and irreversible. Civil society demands that
governments and international institutions take an active role to control regulate and
rechannel the globalization process, and mak[e] it socially and environmentally
accountable.").
147. By this I do not mean to suggest that it is possible to achieve perfect democracy
through politics, or that such national politics have achieved it. Rather, I mean a politics
that values democracy as opposed to one that does not.
148. A few potential objections also come to mind. First, that allowing in wider
representation of interest groups would privilege the West over other countries, much in
the same way as some have argued would result from the judicialization of the dispute
resolution system. My response is, similar to my response to judicialization, that this is not
necessarily true, and it seems at least no more likely in the latter structure than in the
current structure. The second objection would be similar- that the notion of pluralism is
a highly specific notion; this cultural institutional objection may be accurate but also would
apply to all institutions of the GATT. The third objection, in my mind, is the most
interesting-this is the objection that at the international level why should public
representation be demarcated according to nationality-why not according to area of
interest or some other standard?
[Vol. 52
particularly effective in undermining the authority of international
instruments and organizations. 49
Through this lens, the protests in Seattle and other misgivings
about international economic organizations might be viewed as a
resurgence of suspicion and mistrust of international law which, if
heeded, might have destructive consequences for American
participation in the international order, and indeed endanger the
integrity of the order itself. From this perspective, an argument for
increasing popular input and participation in the process of
international rulemaking and adjudication courts disaster by
nurturing protectionist impulses.
The lessons of history must unquestionably be heeded. And yet,
the conventional concerns about popular input are misplaced, or at
least outsized, in the current environment. The first decades after
World War II saw a mighty, even heroic, struggle to secure a process
by which the United States could maintain viable commitment to and
involvement in international affairs commensurate with its new status
as a world power. These early architects of the postwar international
economic order succeeded admirably. Precisely because of their
success, the prospect of increasing public participation in
international lawmaking must be viewed differently than it has been
in the past. Globalization-ushered in by the success of the postwar
international economic order-has ensured that the lives of the
world's citizenries are more interconnected than ever before. Rather
than undoing the progress that has been made in cementing the world
order, introducing democratic politics to international lawmaking
furthers its progressive evolution.
Perhaps the best exemplar of such modification at the
international level is the European Union. Established in 1958 as the
European Economic Communities, the EEC began as a customs
union regulating regional trade in a few specific sectors. Over the
decades, the EEC established increasingly broad control over the
regulatory power of its member states. By the early 1990s,
widespread concern had developed that the arrangement suffered
from a "democracy deficit" - that is, that the regulatory powers of the
system were not sufficiently informed by procedures for popular
149. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Weiner, The Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEo. LJ. 749, 793 (1999) (noting that some skeptics fear the "'black
helicopters' of the United Nations flying over Idaho").
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observation of and participation. 150  The response was the
introduction of greater public participation that has proved critical to
the legitimacy of the modern structure.151
The increasingly common concerns voiced about the WTO and
NAFTA indicate that the international branch of the United States
government suffers from similar problems. The opportunities for
public observation of and participation in the lawmaking that occurs
within these international agencies, however, have remained severely
truncated.
Conclusion
In this Article, I have argued that the rise of economic regulation
by international organizations is transforming federal government in
much the same way as the rise of administrative agencies transformed
it at the beginning of the twentieth century. Just as administrative
agencies came to be recognized as a de facto "fourth branch" of
federal government, United States participation in international
economic organizations has generated a de facto "international
branch" of federal government.
The construction of this international branch, however, remains
incomplete. There has not yet been a period of widespread popular
deliberation on and input into how the international branch should
look, and, as a result, there are some important defects in its current
structure. The text of the federal Constitution cannot offer clear
guidance, because it is indeterminate on the proper relationship
between the United States government and the international order.
The construction effort must fall back, therefore, on a consideration
of fundamental values in American democracy. Ultimately, the new,
international branch of federal government must balance the
competing values that American democratic theory places on
governmental expertise and governmental accountability. In this
light, the ongoing effort to construct the international branch must
correct its current tendency to privilege expediency over openness.
150. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe. 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
151. For a discussion of the "constitutional" aspects of the EU's evolution, see Roger J.
Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of
Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1092 (1995). See also J.H.H.
Weiler, Bread and Circus: The State of European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 223 (1998):
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
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